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charged with the duty of defending or prosecuting in criminal proceed-
ings. 1
The New Jersey court expressly approved of the reasoning and
conclusions of the California decision. The court succinctly summarized
the position suggested in this note:
However, the very fact that our scheme of compensation is
couched in indefinite terms rather than precise monetary figures
leads us to find an intent that the amount awarded should be
somewhat more than the mere token or honorarium appearing
to be the result in many states, even though the recompense
must be considerably less than what would be considered full
compensation were the accused able to pay. While the philosophy
of the assigned counsel system is founded on the basic obligation
of the bar to render gratuitous services to the indigent, legislative
authorization to make any recompense from public funds, espe-
cially where that authority prescribes a general standard keyed
to reasonableness, must necessarily rest on recognition that the
community too should assume some financial responsibility in the
matter and that the bar should not have to carry the whole load.2
This sharing of the burden between the community and the Bar
does present a problem when, as in the instant case, the community
share of the burden must be borne entirely by one county. Here the
defense of three non-resident indigents cost Sauk County, with its
36,179 residents as of 1960, a total of $15,743 or slightly more than
forty cents per person. 13 It is suggested that, since a felony is actually
a crime against the state, the amount that a county be called upon to
supply in the form of compensation to appointed attorneys be limited
and any excess beyond the limitation be borne by the State.
RoCH CARTER
Attorney-Client: Privilege as Applied to a Corporate Litigant
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 43(a)-By virtue of
United States v. Becton Dickinson and Co.," a federal district court has
added a new interpretation to the already confused problem of deter-
mining the availability of the attorney-client privilege to a corporate
litigant in cases arising in federal courts. This case involves a civil
In view of this sharp criticism, this writer does not feel that these jurisdic-
tions should be included in a comparison.
"Hill v. Superior Court, supra note 9, at 14. It is interesting to note that the
trial court in the Conway case "noted that the special assistant district at-
torney had been paid $6500 for his services and expenditures and concluded
that $6500 was fair and reasonable compensation for each defense counsel's
trial work, preparatory work and necessary expenditures." 19 Wis. 2d 599,
602, 120 N.W.2d 671, 673 (1963).
12 Horton v. State, supra note 9, at 8.
13 Brief for Appellant, pp. 118-119, Conway v. Sauk County, supra note 1.
1212 F.Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).
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anti-trust action in which the government filed a motion for an order
requiring the corporate defendant to produce for inspection and copy-
ing certain documents containing communications between the directors,
officers and employees of the defendant and its attorneys. This case
arose in the Federal District Court of New Jersey, a state which, by its
Evidence Act of 1960,2 expressly includes a corporation within the
meaning of "client" for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. The
Court reasoned that under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the law of the state rather than the federal jurisdiction
should apply for the purpose of determining the availability of the
privilege, thus granting the privilege to the corporate defendant.
The various interpretations surrounding Rule 43(a) present a.pic-
ture of complete conflict and confusion. The Rule reads as follows:
... All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under sta-
tutes of the United States or under the rules of evidence here-
tofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing
of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs... [emphasis supplied]
The present state of the law concerning the availability of the attorney-
client privilege to a corporate litigant in the federal courts has branched
into at least three divergent theories. The first was expounded by Chief
Judge Campbell of the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in the case of Radiant Burners v. The American Gas Associ-
ation.3 The decision in this case was based upon federal rather than
state (Illinois) law and came to the conclusion that, contrary to wide
spread prior acceptance, the attorney-client privilege was not available
to a corporate litigant under federal law. However, a diametrically op-
posed view was propounded by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, speaking through Judge Kirk-
patrick, in the case of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.4 This
case also decided the question on the basis of federal precedents but
allowed the corporation to claim the privilege, the opposite result from
that of Radiant Burners. Now, at a time when this conflict has not
been resolved, the Becton Dickinson case gives us a third view, namely
that state law may also be used to decide the question. The problem
now before the federal courts is which of these rulings to consider as
the accepted federal position.
The Hon. Alexander Holtzoff, United States District Judge for the
2 N. J. REV. STAT. §2A: 84A-20 cited in the opinion.
3207 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. II. 1962). This case is noted at 46 MARo. L. REv.
(1963).
4 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D. Penn. 1962).
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District of Columbia, states in an article commenting upon the effect of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
One of the many interesting developments growing out of the
new procedure is Rule 43, relating to evidence. It introduces a
unique principle of rendering admissible any evidence that has
been heretofore admissible in the courts of the United States,
or which is admissible under the laws of the state in which the
United States Court is held. In other words, if either rule of law
favors the admission of the evidence, it prevails over that which
would exclude it.5 [emphasis supplied]
Another author also points out that the purpose of the rule is to broaden
the base of competency in civil cases by making evidence competent if
it is admissible under federal law although not under state law.6 His
article quotes the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as making a statement which tends to set forth
the same interpretation of Rule 43 (a) :
It became obvious that uniformity should prevail [because
actions at law and suits in equity are united] so the Committee
made a rule to the effect that the rules of evidence in actions
under this system should be those prevailing either at law or in
equity or indeed under state practice, and the most liberal rule
tending to allow the admission of evidence should be followed.
7
Based upon the actual wording of the rule and the foregoing, opinions,
it would seem that few problems could arise as to the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege to a corporate litigant. One would surmise
that if the privilege would be denied either on the basis of federal law
or equity precedent or on the basis of the law of the state in which the
federal court was sitting, it must be denied in order to favor the admis-
sibility of the evidence as required by Rule 43(a). This would seem to
be equally true in both diversity and non-diversity cases. However as
cases discussed above indicate, the results are not that simple. The
Beckton Dickinson case claims to be basing its decision on Rule 43(a)
yet it uses state law to uphold the privilege and thus excludes the evi-
dence, when it could have admitted the evidence by denying the privi-
lege under the Radiant Burners decision.
Nor does the confusion end with the divergent opinions already
discussed, for other interpretations of this Tule by both the courts and
commentators frequently bear little relationship to its plain wording
and are often diametrically opposed to each other.8 For example, one
5Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1, at 16-17 (1960).
6 Green, The Admnissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV.
L. REV. 197 (1941).
7 1d. at 207.
8 Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in the Federal
Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 102-103 (1956). This article presents a
resum6 of the divergent interpretations placed upon Rule 43(a) of the
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writer feels that the federal courts are bound to apply the doctrine of
Erie v. Tompkins9 to this question, applying state privilege in diversity
cases but never in litigation involving federal substantive questions.10
Contentions can also be found to the effect that a rule of privilege
is not a rule of "admissibility" so as to come under the purview of
Rule 43(a)."1 The article so contending also states that it is normally
desirable that the state privileges be applied but that a federal court
would not be bound to do so. Some writers feel that the privilege prob-
lem can be treated separately from the question of admissibility which
is supposedly governed by Rule 43(a).1 2 Authority can also be found
to the effect that state law must be followed where it denies a privilege
but not where it grants one.13
Other cases have held that under Rule 43(a), all state privileges
must control,1 4 but other cases as well as commentaries indicate that
only statutory state privileges must control, 5 while others hold that
state privileges are never applicable.1 6 With the cases seeming to apply
either state or federal privileges quite indiscriminately, the law regard-
ing the purpose and power of Rule 43(a) is extremely confused, a fact
that has generally been admitted.
However the law had seemed to be settled on at least one point;
that is: state privileges need not be applied in a "federal question" case
when they are broader than those traditionally recognized in the federal
courts.17 And yet the Becton Dickinson case may be interpreted to have
overthrown this once steadfast principle. It does apply a state privilege
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The import of the entire article is to the
effect that the federal courts must apply state privileges in all cases, whether
they are based upon diversity of citizenship or not. (see p. 121).
0 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of Privileges of Another Juris-
diction, 56 CoL. L. REv. 535, 545-547 (1956).
11 Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the Communication Privilege Under State Law: An
Analysis of Confusion, 7 VAnD. L. Rzv. 556, 563 (1954).
12 Degan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.
341, 353 (1960).
13 Supra note 6.
14 Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965(1956); Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
15 Anderson v. Benson, 117 F.Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953); see also, 5 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE §26.31 (3d ed. 1944) which states, . . . [a] "state statute,
if there is one, should control though it is more restrictive than Federal
precedents, but, if there is no state statute and the Rule is doubtful as to
the particular situation, . . . more liberal federal precedents may be followed."
16 Scourtes v. Fred Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Willard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General Motors Corp., 118 F.Supp. 242,
244 (D.N.J.) 1953, affd., 214 F.2d 664 (1954).
17 Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
849 (1944). Added breadth should not be given to a privilege by virture of
state law where inequities would result therefrom; United States v. Bruner,
200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952) refused to apply a state privilege in a
"Federal question" case; United States v. Kovel, 296 F2d 918 (2d Cir.
1961) refused to apply a state privilege in a federal criminal trial; cf. the
opposite holdings in diversity of citizenship cases, e.g. Stricker v. Morgan,
268 F.2d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 1959).
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statute in a "federal question" case, citing as its authority for so doing,
Stricker v. Morgan,18 a diversity case. The attorney-client privilege, as
applied to a corporate litigant may or may not be considered to be "tra-
ditionally recognized" in the federal courts depending upon whether
you follow the Radiant Burners9 or the Philadelphia case. The court in
Becton Dickinson concludes in its opinion that state law must apply in
the determination of the availability of the privilege to a corporation
completely irrespective of the position of the federal law, by virtue of
Rule 43(a).
In this writer's opinion, the holding in theBecton Dickinson20 case is
contrary to the policy that a state privilege may not broaden the scope
of a federal privilege in a non-diversity case. 21 By virtue of the reason-
ing behind Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 22 state law should govern privilege
when it governs the rest of the substantive law of the case (i.e. a diver-
sity case) so that the federal court will reach substantially similar re-
sults to those which the state court would reach. In a case governed
by federal substantive law, however, it could be argued that, while a
case may directly concern a federal matter, the relationship between
the corporation and its attorney is a transaction separate and distinct
from the federal matter and can thus properly be covered by state law.
The privilege arises out of contract between the attorney and his client.
This is a "state" contract and if what occurs is not privileged under
state law, why should it be privileged because a federal matter is con-
cerned? On the other hand, if the question is one of introducing evi-
dence to prove facts pertaining to a federal matter, a state privilege
should not stand in the way of the federal court ruling so as to accom-
plish a federal purpose. Thus the policy of the words used in the rule
allowing maximum admissibility can be theoretically justified under
these circumstances. The Beckton Dickinson case falls under the latter
and allows a state to impose its privileges or lack of them upon a wholly
federal domain. 23 In any event, Rule 43(a) is a very weak basis upon
which to rest a decision. The apparently ambiguous nature of the Rule
was recognized as far back as 1941.24 Since then, the courts have derived
little or no settled policy regarding its purpose and application.
The above analysis of existing case law leaves few, if any, settled
principles as to the availability of the attorney-client privilege to a cor-
porate litigant in the federal courts. The district courts must first de-
cide what the state of the federal law is concerning the availability of
18 268 F2d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 1959).
1) Supra note 3.2 0 Supra note 4.
21 Supra note 17.
22 Supra note 9.
2 3Supra note 10; for a similar opinion also see 2B BARRON AND HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §967, at 243-244 (1961 ed.).24 Supra note 6, at 224-225.
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the attorney-client privilege. This law is now completely unsettled be-
tween the Philadelphia and Radiant Burners cases. When it is decided
whether or not federal precedents will extend the privilege to a corpora-
tion, then it must be decided whether these precedents or the prevailing
law of the state in which the federal court is sitting must control. It
seems that when the question finally becomes settled, the most probable
result will be that a corporate client would be entitled to claim the at-
torney-client privilege by virtue of a combination of federal and state
precedents in a "federal question" case and that state privileges will
control, as substantive law, in a diversity case.2 5
STEPHENL. BEYER
Criminal Law: Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendant
in Non--Capital State Court Proceeding Required by Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment-On larch 18, 1963 the United
States Supreme Court overruled a decision of twenty-one years stand-
ing and held that the State of Florida's failure to appoint defense coun-
sel in a non-capital criminal case deprived the petitioner of due process
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright.
Petitioner Gideon was charged in a Florida court with having broken
and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor-a felony
under Florida law. Being indigent, petitioner asked the court to appoint
counsel for him. The court denied this request on the basis that no cap-
ital offense was charged and that under the law of Florida, counsel need
be appointed only in capital cases. Petitioner conducted his own de-
fense, was convicted and sentenced to a term of five years. After state
habeas corpus proceedings were exhausted, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to review the question of possible violation of con-
stitutional rights with special attention to the then controlling decision
of Betts v. Brady.2
The facts in the Gideon case are remarkably similar to those of the
1942 Betts case. In both proceedings the defendant requested counsel
in a non-capital felony charge; in both cases counsel was denied and the
defendant was forced to conduct his own defense without in any way
waiving his rights. However, in the Betts case, the rule was laid down
that due process was a flexible concept which must be tested by an ap-
praisal of the totality of facts in a given case.
25 See, holding to this effect, Comercio E. Industria Continental v. Dresser
Industries, 19 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Georgia Pacific Plywood Co. v.
United States Plywood Corp.; 18 F.R.D.. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see also,
Note, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 551 (1963) for other holdings to the same effect.
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
